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Short Papers, Notes, and Comments 
Direct Investment in Conservation Measures by 
a Public Utility 
Anthony M. Marino* and Joseph Sicilian** 
During the period 1978-1980,1 public policy toward U.S.-regulated 
utilities mandated residential conservation programs. Public utilities 
encouraged residential customers to invest in home conservation measures to 
help meet the national goal of energy security. The actual programs growing 
out of this legislation can be grouped as information programs (such as the 
energy audit program), financial incentives or subsidy programs, and direct 
investment programs. Our focus is on the third type wherein the public utility 
itself does home-retrofit conservation work (weather stripping, caulking, 
storm windows and doors, and attic and wall insulation), and the residential 
customer pays no direct charges. (In Marino and Sicilian (1986) we provide 
an economic analysis of information and financial incentives programs.) Our 
principal goals are: (a) to give an economic explanation of why a regulated 
utility would want to provide conservation measures that reduce the demand 
for its primary product and (b) to examine whether existing regulatory 
structure and utility programs are likely to lead to economic efficiency in 
conservation investment. We also provide an idealized regulatory structure 
and conservation program that does lead to economic efficiency. 
The following section presents a simple dynamic model of a regulated 
utility with a direct investment conservation program. Conservation and new 
generating-capacity investments are treated asymmetrically in that the former 
investment creates immediate energy saving, while the latter investment can 
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create only future increases in capacity. Our regulatory apparatus is patterned 
after existing conservation programs of Pacific Power and Light and General 
Public Utilities. Following the general strategy of these programs, our model 
assumes that the public utility issues no direct charges for conservation 
measures and is permitted to place conservation investment expenditures in 
the rate base. After providing an explanation for the incentive for conser-
vation investment, this section concludes that such a program is unlikely to 
lead to economic efficiency. 
The third section provides an idealized direct investment program and 
regulatory policy that does generate economic efficiency. The key ingredients 
of this policy are as follows: the public utility is permitted to issue charges for 
its true final products, which we take as a comfort index; conservation and 
new generating-capacity investments are given rate-base treatment; and the 
rate-of-return constraint guarantees and allowed rate of return on the present 
value of conservation and generating-capacity investments for a period 
starting at the time these investment decisions are made and ends when 
returns from these decisions have been reaped. The last section briefly sum-
marizes our analysis. 
THE PUBLIC UTILITY DOES NOT CHARGE FOR 
CONSERVATION MEASURES 
We now consider a public utility producing one primary product, 
referred to as electricity. Electricity is produced using two inputs: a capital 
input called generating capacity and an operating input called fuel. Letting 
x be the quantity of electricity produced during a given time period, L the 
quantity of fuel used, and K the quantity of generating capacity available, we 
suppose that the technology is described by a production function 
x = F(L, K). 
We assume that investment in generating new capacity requires an extended 
period of time, and thus we consider two periods. In the first one, the firm 
can alter L, but a decision to invest in new generating capacity will not alter 
K until the second period. Let / be the investment in generating capacity. 
Then with Kl denoting the stock of generating capacity in period t, we have 
K2 = Kl + /. In this model, the firm cannot alter Kl but can alter K2 by 
choosing /. Then letting xl be electricity output and V be fuel input in period 
t, we have 
x1 = F(L\KX) (1) 
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and 
x 2 = F(L\ K2) = F(L\ Ky + I). (2) 
We assume that the public utility is subject to rate-of-return regulation. The 
regulator does not set prices but rather sets a maximum rate of return the 
utility is allowed to earn on its investment in capital. The utility can choose 
any price structure as long as demand is met at the chosen prices and the 
maximum rate of return is not exceeded. Let r be the market rate of interest 
and s be the regulator's allowed rate of return on capital (we assume that 
5 > r). 
We now introduce into this traditional set-up a conservation commodity, 
which we think of as a capital good capable of reducing the demand for 
electricity. It can be provided quickly, relative to the time required to install 
generating capacity, and, if provided, it will be available in both periods. Let 
C be the quantity of conservation capital. Letting plx be the price of electricity 
in period t, the demand for electricity in each period is represented by the 
inverse demand function 
We will assume that dp^/dx* < 0 and dplxjdC < 0. That is, demand for x is 
decreasing in x, and x and C are substitutes in consumption. 
As in existing direct investment programs, the public utility does not 
charge its customers directly for providing the conservation commodity, but 
it may be motivated by other aspects of the regulatory structure to provide 
conservation. We will suppose that the regulator does count conservation 
capital as part of the utility's rate base (the stock of capital upon which the 
utility is allowed to earn the regulated rate of return). We want to know 
whether this is sufficient motivation for the utility to provide conservation. 
To summarize, the utility has an existing generating capacity Kl and will 
choose L\ L2, /, and C. Then x 1 and x2 are determined by Equations (1) and 
(2), and p\ and p\ are determined by Equation (3). Electricity revenue in the 
first period is determined by the choice of 1) and C and is given by 
Plx = titf, C), t = 1, 2. (3) 
Rlx(L\ C) = p\(F(L\ Kl\ C) • F(L\ Kl). (4) 
Electricity revenue in the second period is determined by the choice of L 2, /, 
and C and is given by 
Rl(L\ / , C) = pl(F(L2, Kl + /) , C) • F(L\ Kl + / ) . (5) 
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If w is the price of fuel, profits in the two periods are given by 
7il(V, /, C) = Rlx(L\ C) - wV - r(Kl + / + C), (6) 
and 
7 i \ L \ /, C) = R2X(L2, /, C) - wL2 - r(Kl + / + C). (7) 
The utility is interested in maximizing the present value of total profits, 
n(L\ L 2 , /, C) = n\L\ I C) + J3TC2(L2, C), (8) 
where P is the rate-of-time discount. 
The single-period rate-of-return constraints are written as: 
s(Kl + / + C) 4- wL1 - ^ ( L 1 , C) ^ 0, (9) 
and 
s(K{ + / + C) + wZ2 - i?2(L2, /, C) ^ 0. (10) 
It has been suggested that inclusion of conservation capital in the utility's 
rate base may be sufficient to cause the utility to provide such capital.2 We 
find that this is not so in our model.3 
Proposition 1. A public utility deriving revenue only from the sale of electricity 
and maximizing profits subject to rate-of-return constraints will not choose to 
invest in conservation capital. (That is, if L 1, L 2 , /, and C maximize 7i(L\ L2, 
/, C) subject to Equations (9) and (10), then C = 0.) 
The intuition behind proposition 1 is that a binding rate-of-return con-
straint in each period requires that both investment types entering the rate 
base at time 1 (namely C and I) must generate equal and positive present-
value marginal revenue streams for there to be positive conservation and new 
generating-capacity investments. Because conservation capital serves to 
decrease electricity revenue in any period (<dpx/dC < 0) and the sale of 
electricity is the firm's only source of revenue, conservation capital cannot 
meet the above restriction for an interior solution. 
Because there are regulated public utilities investing in conservation, the 
model thus far presented is inadequate for understanding observed behavior. 
2. See Krasniewski and Murdock (1980). 
3. Proofs of all three propositions are available from the authors. 
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One possibility is that the real-world public utility is not subjected to a 
binding rate-of-return constraint at each period. After all, we do not observe 
public utilities facing rate hearings at each and every point in time corre-
sponding to when choice variable decisions are made. Instead we see rate 
hearings spaced discretely through time. At a hearing the Averch-Johnson 
binding rate-of-return constraint is relevant, but between hearings the firm 
makes resource choices facing prices determined at the last review (as a 
fixed-price constraint). This description of the regulatory process is presented 
in Joskow (1974) and in the literature on regulatory lag (see Bailey 1973). In 
this model, we can formulate the above scenario by assuming that in the first 
period the utility is forced to meet current demand at a fixed price for 
electricity and must wait until the second period for a rate review and price 
amendment. If this is the case, it would be appropriate to replace the first 
period rate-of-return constraint in Equation (9) with the fixed-price 
constraint 
p\ - plx(F(L\ Kl), C) = 0 (11) 
and the profit function n with 
n(L\ L2, /, C) = plx • F(L\ Kl) - wLl - r(Kl + / + C) 
+ Pn2(L2, / , C). 
We find that under constraint (11), the question of conservation invest-
ment centers on the relationship between the fixed price of electricity in 
period 1, p[x, and the marginal operating cost of electricity production in 
period 1. This marginal operating cost is given by 
w M0C\L\O = J ; m ; w y 
where Fh i = L, K, denotes a partial derivative.4 
Proposition 2. A public utility maximizing the present value of profits subject 
to a fixed-price constraint in period 1 and a rate-of-return constrain in period 
2 may choose to invest in conservation capital for the case where revenue is 
derived only from the sale of electricity. A necessary condition for such invest-
ment to occur is that the marginal operating cost of electricity production in 
period 1 is greater than the fixed price of electricity in period 1. (That is, if (L1, 
L\ /, C) maximizes n(L\ L\ I, C) subject to Equations (11) and (10), then it 
may be that C > 0. If C > 0, then MOC\t\ Kl) > p\.) 
4. See note 3 above. 
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The economic reasoning underlying proposition 2 is fairly clear. When the 
operating cost of producing another unit of electricity is greater than the 
regulated price, profit is raised by decreasing electricity production. Invest-
ment in conservation capital is the tool used by the public utility to reduce 
the demand for and thus the production of electricity. It is interesting that the 
existence of a spread between operating cost and price is precisely the reason 
given by public utilities such as Pacific Power and Light and General Public 
Utilities for implementing their direct conservation investment programs. 
For Pacific Power and Light, this spread was estimated to be as much as 3.50 
per kilowatt-hour in the late seventies.5 
Proposition 2 may tell us why utilities invest in conservation products, but 
it raises another question. Under the assumptions of proposition 2, the utility 
will not invest in conservation if the price of electricity is greater than the 
marginal operating cost of electricity production. However, investment in 
conservation may be economically desirable (from a social viewpoint) even 
if the price is greater than this marginal cost. More specifically, conservation 
investment would be desirable if the cost of saving one unit of electricity 
through conservation is less than the marginal cost of producing one unit of 
electricity. Thus even under the assumptions of proposition 2, the profit 
motive of the regulated utility does not guarantee that conservation will be 
provided in all situations where it is desirable. Furthermore, even if it is 
provided, there is no reason to believe that it will be provided at a level that 
is optimal in any sense. 
THE PUBLIC UTILITY ISSUES COMFORT 
INDEX CHARGES 
It is apparent from a close examination of propositions 1 and 2 that 
an important impediment to the optimal implementation of conservation 
products is the inability of the public utility to charge for those products. We 
shall consider a somewhat idealized scheme that could be quite successful in 
bringing about an efficient use of conservation services. 
We think of electricity and conservation services as being intermediate 
inputs into the production of a final product or comfort index we will call, 
for the purpose of exposition, warmth. Ideally, the utility could be respon-
sible for providing this final good and could charge for warmth rather than 
for the intermediate inputs to warmth. The utility would then be choosing the 
mix of electricity and conservation services. We then conjecture that the 
utility would make an efficient choice of these variables, at least to the extent 
that the normal regulatory process does not distort decision making away 
5. See Marino and Sicilian (1982) and Chicchetti and Shaughnessy (1980) for an analysis of. 
the Pacific Power and Light Program. 
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from an efficient input mix. We will now turn to an examination of this 
conjecture. 
If the public utility were to add an additional unit of generating capacity, 
with conservation investment fixed, then the same level of warmth could be 
produced in the second period with a reduction in fuel usage. The quantity 
of fuel reduction that could be achieved by a one-unit increase in generating 
capacity is given by 
(dF(L\ K2)/dK) 
) K L ^ ' A ; ~ (dF(L\ K2)/dL) RTSKL(L\K2) = 
(Here RTS stands for rate of technical substitution.) We have assumed that 
the public utility has one type of capital and that there is scope for substitut-
ing capital for an operating input. In reality, utilities use many different 
capital types and have the ability to substitute aggregate capital for aggregate 
operating inputs. Thus we think of L and K as aggregate composites. 
As an alternative to generating-capacity investment, if the public utility 
were to add an additional unit of conservation investment, with generating 
capacity fixed, then the same level of warmth could be produced in each of 
the two periods with a reduction of fuel usage in each period. Let 
Wl = W{x\ C) 
denote the warmth production function, and let Wh i = x,C denote partial 
derivatives. Given W fixed, another unit of C achieves a reduction of 
RTV (V AT' D - W c { F ( L ' > C ) 
units of fuel in period 1 and a reduction of 
RTSCL(L2, K2, C) = WX(F(L2, K2), C) • Fl(L2, K2) 
units of fuel in period 2. The total present value of fuel saving resulting from 
a unit of conservation investment is then w • ( R T S y C L + jiRTSl,). If there is 
to be an efficient mix of investment in generating capacity and investment in 
conservation, then at the margin the present value of fuel saved due to 
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conservation investment must equal the present value of fuel saving from 
investment in generating capacity. That is, we must have 
W • (RTSLCL + L3RTS2CL) = W • PRTSKL. (12) 
We now consider the behavior of the public utility that produces and 
charges for warmth and is subject to rate-of-return regulation. We suppose 
that demand for warmth is represented by the inverse demand functions 
p'w = PWW), T = 1,2. (13) 
With KL fixed, the utility will choose L\ L2, /, and C. Revenue in period 1 is 
given by 
RUL\ C) = C)) • W(F(L\ KL), C), (14) 
and revenue in period 2 is given by 
R2W{L\ / , C ) = p2W{ W(F(L2, KL + / ) , O ) • W(F(L\ KL + / , C) . (15) 
Profits in the two periods are given by 
tI X W(L\ / , C) = R\V(L\ C) - WLX - r(KL + / + C) , (16) 
and 
7^(L2, /, C) = R2iv(L2, /, C) - wL2 - + / + C), (17) 
and the present value of total profits is 
NW(L\ L 2 , / , C ) = t I X W ( L \ / , C) Hh ^ ( L 2 , / , C ) . (18) 
The single-period rate-of-return constraints are 
s(KL + / + C ) + WLX - RLW(L\ C) ^ 0, 
and 
s(KL + / + C ) + w I 2 - R2W(L\ /, C) ^ 0. (19) 
If the public utility chooses L\ L 2, /, and C to maximize profits NW subject 
to the rate-of-return constrains in Equations (18) and (19), then the efficiency 
Investment in Conservation Measures by a Public Utility / 145 
condition (12) will not be satisified. This is because the efficiency condition 
(12) requires a certain intertemporal efficiency that the separate constraints 
(18) and (19) of the traditional Averch-Johnson literature do not permit. It 
may be efficient for the utility to trade off profits in one period for profits in 
another period, but the single-period rate-of-returns constraints do not allow 
this. If instead of Equations (18) and (19), the utility faces the intertemporal 
rate-of-return constraint 
s{ 1 + P)(Kl + / + C) + wLl + 13wL2 - (Rlw + j3R 2 W) ^ 0, (20) 
then the profit-maximizing choice of L\ L2, /, and C will satisfy Equation 
(12). The constraint in Equation (20) says that at the time C and / investment 
decisions are made (the initial time period) the public utility is guaranteed the 
allowed rate of return on the present value of these investments, where the 
present-value time interval allows both investment types to generate returns. 
We summarize these conclusions in proposition 3.6 
Proposition 3. Consider the situation where the public utility charges for the 
comfort index. If the utility chooses (L\ L2, /, C) to maximize nw(L\ L2, /, C) 
subject to the single-period rate-of-return constraints in Equations (18) and 
(19), then the choice will not satisfy the efficiency condition (12). However, if 
(L1, L2,1, C) is chosen to maximize nw(L\ L 2, /, C) subject to the multiperiod 
rate-of-return constraint in Equation (20), then this choice will satisfy the 
efficiency condition (12). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our analysis of direct investment programs provides several general 
conclusions. First, rate-base treatment of conservation investment expen-
ditures is quite unlikely to guarantee economic efficiency in a program that 
places no direct or indirect charges on conservation measures. This result 
holds with continuously binding, as well as lagged, rate-of-return regulation. 
Second, an important device in providing the utility with the incentive to 
make an efficient choice of conservation investment is to allow it to charge 
for its actual final product, which we termed comfort. Finally, in conjunction 
with such charges, rate-base treatment of conservation and new generating-
capacity investments must guarantee an allowed rate of return on the present 
value of such investments over a period that permits returns from both types 
of investments. 
6. See note 3 above. 
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